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Abstract 
 
The effect of outsourcing on government accountability for public services continues to be 
contested. Analysts point to an accountability deficit while governments insist that accountability is 
retained (and indeed improved). The existence of an accountability deficit is confirmed, using 
examples from the Commonwealth Job Network. The government claim, that accountability 
remains, is best interpreted as rhetorical, as a refusal to shift blame to private contractors, even 
though some channels of accountability may be weakened. The claim can be seen as evidence of 
am increasing incorporation of private contractors into the overall structure of government. 
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Abstract 
The effect of outsourcing on government accountability for public services continues 
to be contested.  Analysts point to an accountability deficit while governments insist 
that accountability is retained (and indeed improved).  The existence of an 
accountability deficit is confirmed, using examples from the Commonwealth Job 
Network.  The government claim, that accountability remains, is best interpreted as 
rhetorical, as a refusal to shift blame to private contractors, even though some 
channels of accountability may be weakened. The claim can be seen as evidence of 
am increasing incorporation of private contractors into the overall structure of  
government. 
 
I 
Over the last decade and a half, governments have increasingly opted out of 
the direct provision of public services, preferring instead to outsource provision to 
independent private contractors.  Regardless of whether such arrangements achieve 
their aim of improving the efficiency and effectiveness of public services (and the 
evidence is mixed (eg Hodge 1998)), their effect on accountability has always been 
contested.  On the one hand, supporters of outsourcing and purchaser/provider splits 
generally, have claimed that there is no negative effect on accountability: 
governments, as purchasers, remain accountable for the services they agree to buy (eg 
Industry Commission 1996).  Responsibility may be devolved but accountability 
remains intact.  Indeed, the supporters argue, accountability is supplemented and 
improved through the detailed specification of required outputs in a prior agreement 
or contract.   
                                                 
* An earlier version of this paper was presented to the IPAA annual Academics and Practitioners Day, 
University of Canberra, November 2004.  The author acknowledges helpful comments from 
participants as well as research assistance from Andrew Rowe, funded by the Australian Research 
Council.  
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On the other hand, academic analysts have been more sceptical, seeing 
definite reductions in accountability, particularly where the provider is a private 
organisation (Mulgan 1997, Owens 2001, Seddon 2004, Considine 2002).  Private 
contractors are simply not subject to the same range of accountability mechanisms as 
government departments.  Contracting out involves, at best, a trade-off between 
accountability and efficiency. This criticism has been taken up by some agencies of 
public scrutiny, notably the Commonwealth Auditor-General (eg Barrett, 1999, 2001) 
and various parliamentary committees (eg JCPAA 2000, SFPARC 2001). 
The disagreement, which has simmered along for almost a decade, shows no 
sign of resolution.  The critics still point out, with apparently incontrovertible logic 
and evidence, that some aspects of accountability are definitely reduced under 
outsourcing (Mulgan 2003, ch 5; Barrett 2004). The powers that be, on the other hand, 
remain convinced that accountability continues unchanged, even if responsibility is 
devolved.  The Commonwealth Government response to the Report by the Joint 
Committee of Public Accounts and Audit on Contract Management may be taken as a 
considered  expression of current government policy:  
agencies remain accountable for the delivery of services even where the 
service delivery is provided by the private sector (Senate Hansard 14 May 2002, 
1382). 
 
How can this be?  Is one side just plainly wrong? Or are both sides talking past 
each other?   The solution to this analytical impasse, it will be argued, is to see the 
government position as rhetorical rather than as literal.  The claim that accountability 
remains, while strictly speaking inaccurate, can be read as rhetorically meaningful, 
expressing the willingness of governments to retain ultimate responsibility for the 
quality of public services that they fund and a corresponding refusal to pass the buck 
to private contractors.   The public still assert a right to blame governments for 
unsatisfactory public services provided by private contractors.  Governments, for their 
part, while having flirted with the temptation of offloading blame on to contractors, 
have come to accept that the public expect them to remain accountable.  The corollary 
is that governments have an incentive to exercise increasing control over contractors’ 
performance. 
This article begins with the case for the critics, indicating some of the major 
aspects of the accountability deficit under outsourcing.  Illustrations will be taken 
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from the Job Network, the collection of private contractors who provide employment 
services to job-seekers. The Network is administered by the Department of 
Employment and Workplace Relations (DEWR) and is the major Commonwealth 
example of contracted services provided directly to the public. Attention will then be 
directed towards what advocates of outsourcing might intend to mean by denying the 
accountability deficit and by claiming that accountability remains and is, indeed, 
strengthened.  In conclusion, the claim will be seen to underline the increasing 
incorporation of private contractors into the overall structure of  government and a 
further blurring between the public and private sectors. 
II 
The question of a possible accountability deficit can initially be discussed in 
terms of the familiar dimensions of accountability, who, to whom, for what and how 
(Mulgan 2003, 22-30).   From the perspective of the current debate, the who of 
accountability remains unchanged under a purchaser/provider split.  Both before and 
after separation, the focus is on the government, either the minister or the government 
department, and its accountability for the service in question.   Has government 
accountability remained or has it been diminished? Similarly, the to whom is also 
unchanged, covering the normal direction of ministerial and departmental 
accountability to the various accountability agencies, such as Parliament, the Auditor-
General, the Ombudsman and the courts, and ultimately to members of the public.   
However, the mechanism of accountability, the how, is somewhat altered.  In 
answering for the actions of a private provider, the government is not in a position to 
issue direct instructions to the same extent as it can with a government department.  
Instead, dealings with the provider are mediated through the contract which sets out 
the services required and the procedures to be followed.  The contract can specify 
avenues of inquiry and communication that ministers and officials may use in 
exercising accountability.  For example, the current Employment Services Contract 
(DEWR 2002a 2002) stipulates that  
The Provider must give DEWR full and free access to documents and records 
by:  
(a) allowing DEWR, at all reasonable times, unhindered access to the 
Provider’s eligible job seeker records, financial accounts and records as 
described in clauses 4.8 and 6, and any other documents or records pertaining 
to the delivery of the Services; 
 4
(b) allowing DEWR to copy the same; and 
(c) providing reasonable assistance to DEWR to locate and copy eligible job 
seeker records, financial accounts and records, and any other documents or 
records pertaining to the delivery of the Services. (Part A, section  13.1). 
 
The Contract also allows for immediate contact between the parties:  
If DEWR becomes aware of a problem it must contact the Contact Person. If 
the Provider becomes aware of a problem it must contact the Account 
Manager. 
 (Part A, section 18.1) 
 
 Even so, in spite of their comprehensive coverage, these avenues of 
communication, still fall short of the largely untrammelled rights of access allowed 
within a government department.    
Similarly, other agencies of government accountability do not normally have 
direct access to private contractors and must rely on what the government can tell 
them.  Parliamentary committees, for instance, cannot directly interrogate private 
contractors but must rely on second-hand reports from government officials.  Rights 
of legal redress through the courts are also significantly affected by the transfer of 
service provision to a private contractor (Seddon  2004, Owens 2001).   In particular, 
because the contract is between the government and the contractor, members of the 
public who receive the service are not themselves parties to the contract.  Public rights 
of legal accountability are therefore significantly reduced under the principle of 
privity of contract which generally confines the legal right of redress to the 
contracting parties.   Recourse to the Commonwealth Ombudsman for those 
complaining against private contractors, though sought by successive Ombudsmen 
and supported by other bodies (eg ARC 1998),  remains denied by the government.  
In the case of the Job Network, however, this deficiency has been partly circumvented 
by the fact that the contracting Department (DEWR) provides a complaints procedure 
for disgruntled citizen-customers and that these customers can complain to the 
Ombudsman about how the Department has handled their complaint (DEWR 2002b)   
Auditors-general have been in the forefront in seeking public accountability 
from private contractors, particularly in the classic audit functions of financial 
compliance.  Though Auditors-General lack the general rights of audit and associated 
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access to private contractors' accounts that they exercise over public agencies, they 
have strongly recommended that all government contracts provide the Auditor-
General with sufficient powers to guarantee that public funds have been spent as 
authorised.  Department of Finance and Administration Procurement Guidelines now 
advise that agencies   
should consider, on a case-by-case basis, the inclusion of… standard access 
clauses… that …provide the ANAO and Commonwealth agencies with access to 
information held by contractors and third party subcontractors, including access to 
records, information and assets directly relevant to the contract performance. (DOFA 
2005) 
 
Thus, for instance, the Job Network contract specifies that the powers of 
access to providers' premises and documents enjoyed by DEWR officers (quoted 
above) should also be extended to the Auditor-General and to the Privacy 
Commissioner though only for the purpose of exercising their respective statutory 
functions  (DEWR 2002a, Part A, section 13.6, 9-10)  In spite of such inroads into the 
privacy of private contractors, however, the overall structure of public accountability 
faced by such actors is significantly less than that imposed on government agencies 
and public officials. 
Perhaps the most striking deficit, however, is in the fourth dimension of  
accountability, the for what or scope of accountability, that is the matters for which 
ministers and their officials are accountable to Parliament and the public. For instance, 
once a service is outsourced, many aspects of the outsourcing arrangement are treated 
as commercially confidential and beyond the range of public inquiry.   The actual 
details of the contracts themselves between government and provider may be 
protected from public scrutiny.  Agencies are required to report to Parliament about 
all contracts over $100,000 but the information sought is restricted to a few key 
aspects of the contract, such as the name of the contractor, the general subject matter 
of the contract, the term and price of the contract, and whether the contract contains 
any specific confidentiality clauses.  Such information, while significant, falls well 
short of full disclosure.  Individual Job Network contracts, for instance, are not 
available to parliamentary committees or the public.  
The rationale for secrecy is that contracts contain commercially sensitive 
information which, if revealed, could damage the interest of  the contractors in 
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relation to their competitors.  Private contractors, it is argued, will be less willing to 
tender if they know that the terms of contracts will be published, thus reducing the 
benefits to be gained from outsourcing to the private sector.  However, as is well 
known, much of the information claimed to be commercially confidential does not 
have such a damaging potential.  The claim of commercial confidentiality has often 
been used simply to hide material that is politically embarrassing to the government 
or else is information that private companies are simply not accustomed to disclose.  
Complaints from government auditors and parliamentary committees about the 
misuse of commercial confidentiality have in fact pared back some of the secrecy 
surrounding outsourcing contracts (Freiberg 1999,  Barrett 1999, 2001). The general 
presumption is now in favour of disclosure rather than confidentiality.  It is now 
widely accepted that private sector companies contracting with governments must 
accept a higher degree of public scrutiny than normal.   
None the less, perhaps the most striking aspect of the disputes over 
commercial confidentiality is that they tend to centre on access to information about 
what governments have done, over how much they have paid to whom and for what.  
How much individual contractors themselves spend in carrying out their contracts is 
looked on as their own affair and not a matter of public interest, even though 
taxpayers’ funds are involved. The type of fierce scrutiny given to public servants’ 
expenditure over items such as travel expenses is not extended to members of private 
contracting firms.  The amounts of money paid to individual members of the 
outsourcing contractor are treated as commercially confidential to the contractor not 
so much because they are sensitive information that might affect the contractor's 
competitive position.  Rather such details are considered to be simply none of the 
public's business and, indeed, they appear to fall outside the range of public curiosity 
and public outrage. 
Under outsourcing, public oversight is also reduced over conditions of 
employment. While appointment to positions in the public service is subject to 
principles of merit appointment, designed to exclude the influence of cronyism, 
nepotism or sexism, private contractors are not generally subject to the same 
expectations.  Contract cleaners, for instance, are often employed on the basis of 
family or other personal connections even though public funds are the ultimate source 
of their wages.  Concerns about merit are usually strictly enforced in the contacting 
process, to make sure that politicians and officials do not exercise undue favouritism 
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in the awarding of contracts. But after the contract has been awarded, the employer is 
generally free to follow private sector practices instead of adopting stricter public 
sector standards. As with other aspects of the outsourcing contracts, the focus of 
public interest is on the actions of government employees.  
Indeed, freedom from public employment conditions is one of the main 
sources of savings from outsourcing, particularly in the less skilled functions such as 
cleaning, gardening and rubbish collection  (Industry Commission 1996).    
Appointing one’s friends and relations is much cheaper and quicker than advertising, 
taking up references and holding interviews.  In addition, pay rates and other 
conditions of employment at the lower end of the scale tend to be less generous in the 
private sector and thus allow for considerable savings in the provision of unskilled 
services. 
Admittedly, private employers do face some restrictions on appointment 
practices, for instance under anti-discrimination legislation; some further equal 
employment conditions can also be written into contracts.  For example, the Job 
Network providers to whom the Equal Opportunity for Women in the Workplace Act 
1999 applies must not only comply with that Act but also ensure that sub-contractors 
comply (DEWR 2002a, Part section 14.3).  Appointment procedures in the Job 
Network were the subject of controversy in 2000 when religious organisations such as 
the Salvation Army and Mission Australia took on new staff to meet their newly 
expanded government contracts.  Prospective employees were questioned abut their 
religious beliefs and were made to understand that subscribing to the religion in 
question was a condition of employment.  After complaints were laid with the Human 
Rights and Equal Opportunities Commission (HREOC 2000, ch 5), the Human Rights 
Commissioner argued that such questions were discriminatory (Canberra Times 5 
August 2000).  In response, the relevant Minister,  Tony Abbott, defended the right of 
religious organisations to protect their own values and beliefs and to employ their 
own co-religionists (Canberra Times 12 September 2000).  Indeed, the Minister had 
previously been on record praising the capacity of religion-based charities to offer 
particularly valuable services to job-seekers (eg Abbott 1999).  
After considerable consultation, the HREOC issued a statement on the 
application of the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Act 1986 to religious 
freedom and non-discrimination in employment (HREOC undated).  It declared that  
to require a religious test for a job is generally discriminatory under the Act. However, 
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exceptions are admissible where membership of the religion is related to the inherent 
requirements of the position and is needed to avoid offence to the religious 
susceptibilities of the members of the organisation.  In effect, religious organisations 
can offer preference to adherents of their faith, provided such adherence is justified in 
terms of the values of the organisation and its social role.   
Significantly, the Commission gave no formal weight to the objection, implicit 
in some of the complaints, that the application of a religious test was particularly 
questionable where public funds were being used to employ people providing a public 
service. The Commission’s policy statement suggests that religious discrimination in 
employment is generally illegitimate (subject always to exceptions) regardless of 
whether the employer is publicly funded or not. The Commission has defended a 
general ban on religious discrimination but has not sought to given any additional 
weight to any supposed need to avoid such discrimination when private organisations 
are fulfilling public contracts.  Ultimately, this incident tends to confirm, rather than 
reduce, the gap between public and private sector standards of employment.  Public 
agencies remain more highly accountable for employment practices than private 
organisations, even when these organisations are being employed to pursue public 
functions at public expense.   
III 
In certain major respects, then, the scope of accountability, the for what, is 
reduced through outsourcing.  However, the matters in question, such as levels of 
expenditure and employment conditions, tend to be internal to the contracting 
organisation. They concern the means by which the service is provided and the 
manner in which it is provided, rather than the quality of the service itself.   That is, 
the accountability deficit is centred primarily on inputs and processes rather than on 
outputs and outcomes.   In this case, the claim that governments and government 
agencies 'remain accountable for the delivery of services even when the service 
delivery is provided by the private sector', it can be argued, is primarily about the end 
product, the services themselves.  The main burden of the claim is then that ministers 
or senior public servants cannot escape accountability for the quality of a service just 
because it is not directly provided by their own department.  In the case of the Job 
Network, for instance, ministers and departmental secretaries are clearly not being 
held accountable for everything that goes on in, say, Job Futures (a commercial 
provider) or Employment Plus (the Salvation Army's employment organisation) in the 
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same way that they are accountable for what happens in their departments. The claim 
of unreduced accountability is clearly more limited in scope, referring to the actual 
service itself and not the means by which it is produced. 
What, then, of this accountability for the service itself?   Is it possible for 
purchasing governments to remain as accountable for the quality of services provided 
by independent contractors as they are for services provided by their own 
departments?   Or is there an accountability deficit here too, in the end product as well 
as in the process by which the service is produced? Here it may be useful to 
distinguish between general and particular accountability (Mulgan 2003, 28).  
General accountability refers to accountability for general policy or overall 
performance while particular accountability is restricted to accountability for 
particular decisions.  When governments claim to be accountable for public services 
such as employment services under the Job Network, they may be referring to their 
obligation to answer for the general services as a whole, for the policies and rules 
which determine the contracts with providers or for the general performance of 
contractors.  Alternatively, government accountability may focus on particular 
accountability and the obligation to answer to individual members of the public for 
the quality of the service they have themselves have received from a particular 
provider.  
Another relevant distinction is between various stages of accountability, in 
particular three stages of information, discussion and rectification (Mulgan 2003, 30).  
The meaning of these stages is fairly self-evident. Information refers to the obligation 
on the part of the person or organisation being held to account to answer questions 
and report about their activities.  Discussion involves the further obligation to enter 
into a dialogue of explanation and justification in response to scrutiny. Rectification is 
the final stage set in motion when mistakes are made and includes the obligation to 
impose remedies and sanctions where necessary.  
Beginning with general accountability, in relation to these three stages, can 
ministers and officials (i) provide the same level of information, (ii) enter into the 
same degree of public discussion and explanation, and (iii) impose the same remedies 
and sanctions in relation to the overall performance of contractors as they could if the 
service were provided by officials in their own departments?   The answer depends, to 
a certain extent, on the nature of the contract itself.   In relation to information (i), 
most service contracts specify the services required and provide for detailed reporting 
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of performance.  The more politically sensitive the service, the more comprehensive 
the contract and the more extensive the information required.  The Job Network 
contract, for instance, requires that  
the Provider must assist DEWR to monitor, measure and evaluate the delivery 
of the Services in accordance with the provisions set out in clauses 12.2 and 
12.3, covering monitoring. 
DEWR will monitor, measure and evaluate the performance of the Provider’s 
contractual obligations by collecting performance data, including data about 
the Provider’s performance at the Labour Market Region level, Employment 
Service Area level, Site level, or the harvest area level against the Key 
Performance Indicators. (DEWR 2002a, Part A, section 12.1-2) 
 
However, such information is merely evidence of the accountability of the 
contractors to government.  The government's own accountability requires a further 
link in the information chain, the disclosure of  such performance information to the 
wider public so that the public can hold the government accountable for the quality of 
its services it is purchasing.  At this point, an accountability deficit emerges because 
such performance information is not always made readily available to the public. For 
instance, DEWR does not publicly reveal details about the assessments it makes of the 
performance of individual Job Network providers.  Even with comprehensive 
reporting and disclosure to government, the amount of detail passed on to the public 
through channels such as parliamentary committees is significantly restricted and 
substantially less than would be forthcoming from a government provider such as 
Centrelink.    If the public is prevented from gaining access to performance 
information, then its capacity to hold governments accountable for the performance is 
significantly reduced.   
Similarly, in the case of discussion and justification (ii) .  While ministers can 
be required to explain and justify the details of the purchasing policy, such as the 
general form of the contracts and how contracts are managed in general, they cannot 
so readily explain and justify the performance of individual contractors when the 
detailed information, on which such debate would be premised, is not publicly 
accessible.  Again, within the confines of government operations, contractors may be 
internally accountable to departmental officials and ministers, but unless the wider 
public can be brought into the dialogue, the government as a whole is able to avoid 
 11
accountability.  Indeed, much of the supposed increase in accountability attributed to 
outsourcing is similarly internal in character.  Formal contracts require desired outputs 
to be clearly specified and they enable providers to be held clearly accountable for 
results.  But much of this increased accountability takes place within government 
itself and is not translated into improved accountability of government itself unless 
the process is publicly transparent.  
With respect to rectification (iii), the standard structure of a government 
department under ministerial direction allows ministers to impose immediate 
remedies or adjustments when policies fail or performance standards lapse.  With 
outsourced services, however, ministers and purchasing agencies do not have 
similarly direct control over contractors and may not be in a position to direct the 
imposition of remedies or the payment of compensation in the case of mistakes. 
Contracts usually provide for sanctions against breaches of conditions by the 
contractor and even, in extreme cases, for the termination of the contract.  The Job 
Network contracts allow for immediate termination on a number of specified grounds, 
such as unsatisfactory performance, breaches of the contract, liquidation or 
bankruptcy, or for termination at fourteen days notice for any reason (DEWR 2002a, 
Part A, section 18.5, 7).  But such remedies fall short of the right of day-to-day 
direction available to a minister or departmental head in relation to members of a 
department in his or her charge. The extent of political accountability is therefore 
certainly diminished through the absence of direct control. 
Particular accountability, the obligation of the service provider to answer to 
individual citizen-customers concerning a particular service, is also affected by 
outsourcing, though to a lesser extent.  In relation to information (i), outsourcing 
contracts usually protect the rights of individual citizens to inquire about their own 
individual cases and to have access to any personal information held by the provider 
(eg DEWR 2002a Part A, section 17).    Contracts can also establish procedures for 
citizens to enter into discussion (ii) about their cases, to register their complaints and 
to seek rectification (iii).  The Job Network contract requires that;  
the Provider will establish and will publicise the existence of a Complaints 
process which will deal with Complaints lodged by eligible job seekers and 
employers about the Provider’s services. 
The Provider warrants that it will publicise its Complaints process to eligible 
job seekers and employers. 
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The Provider warrants that should an eligible job seeker or employer be 
dissatisfied with the results of the Complaints process, the Provider will refer 
the eligible job seeker or employer to the DEWR Customer Service Line for 
further investigation of the Complaint and the Provider undertakes to assist 
DEWR in the investigation of the Complaint. (DEWR 2002a, Part A, section 
19. -3) 
 
As already noted, recourse to the Commonwealth Ombudsman is not available against 
contractors but may be sought in relation to the Department's own handling of 
complaints, which is tantamount to normal access to the Ombudsman.  One area of 
reduced accountability flows from the limited leverage available to individual 
Members of Parliament and their electorate officials who are often the first port of call 
for citizens in difficulties with officialdom.  Because ministers lack the power of 
direct inquiry and intervention, MPs are less able to mobilise political channels to 
assist their constituents. Overall, however, particular accountability rights are less 
affected than general accountability rights. 
IV 
Thus, even if the claim of undiminished accountability for outsourced services 
is restricted to the end-product rather than the process by which the end-product is 
reached, the claim is not accurate.  Ministers and senior government officials are 
simply not as accountable for the services provided by private contractors as they 
would be if the services  were provided by their own departments.  Perhaps, then, 
something else again is meant.  Another way of interpreting the statements is to see 
them as a  response to arguments about responsibility and blame.  Critics have 
sometimes expressed the fear that once governments devolve responsibility for 
services to a separate organisation, governments will be able to engage in buck-
passing and blame-shifting (eg Mulgan 1997,  Funnell 2001, Hood 2002). When 
things go wrong, it is feared, the fact that service delivery is now in the hands of a 
contractor rather than the government will entitle ministers and government officials 
to refer any public anger over poor performance to the contractor.  
Indeed, some of the original theoretical justifications for separating purchasers 
from providers talked of the advantages of clarifying responsibilities and associated 
accountability (NZ Treasury 1987).  Governments would retain responsibility and 
accountability for policy and overall directions, while organisationally distinct 
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providers, whether independent government agencies or private contractors, would be 
held accountable for delivering specified outputs.  These independent government 
agencies or private contractors could be given their detailed instructions but then left 
to get on with the job, freed from the day-to-day political interference typically foisted 
on government departments.   For instance, in the early years of the executive agency 
movement (as exemplified, for instance,  by the UK 'Next Steps' initiatives), ministers 
certainly sought to distance themselves from responsibility and accountability for 
operational matters (O'Toole and Chapman 1995; Woodhouse 1997).  However, such 
a policy ran counter to long-standing conventions of ministerial responsibility and 
was always fraught with ambiguity. In the end, as all Westminster jurisdictions have 
found, ministers cannot wash their hands of  liability for service provision.  Whether 
the service is provided by a government department, an executive agency, a statutory 
authority or even a privatised company, governments will be blamed for service 
failures and, at times of public anger, ministers pass the buck at their political peril 
(Hood 2002).  
In such a context, governments are now attempting to reassure the public that 
they will answer for the quality of outsourced services and will seek adequate 
remedies in the light of unsatisfactory performance. They will not use any loss of 
direct access or diminished control as a reason for passing the buck to the contractor.  
Thus, perhaps the key issue is not how much information is publicly available or how 
much control governments actually have but rather whether they are entitled to shift 
blame away from themselves.  By claiming to retain accountability, governments 
undertake to accept the same degree of political risk as before and not to pass the buck. 
In the case of the Job Network, for instance, the Commonwealth government 
is clearly concerned for the quality of the services and anxious to avoid blame for 
unsatisfactory performance by individual contractors.  This is evident, for instance, in 
a number of accountability requirements already referred to, such as the establishment 
of  internal grievance procedures, the right of disgruntled citizen-customers to appeal 
to the Department and subsequently to the Commonwealth Ombudsman, the regular 
monitoring of individual providers and the offering of incentives, such as 'star' 
ranking and increased business, to the best performers.  In addition, contractors are 
required to follow a code of conduct that incorporates public service values relevant 
to service delivery, such as the obligation to treat members of the public ‘with  
fairness and respect’ and ‘to consider their individual circumstances and backgrounds’ 
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(DEWR 2002b).   Every attempt is being made to encourage private providers to act 
with the same degree of professionalism as that expected from public servants.  The 
relationships between government and contractors are being seen more as networked 
partnerships for shared objectives than as self-interested contractual relationships 
(Considine 2001).  
From this perspective, governments are not attempting to use contracting out 
as a means of dodging accountability for the end product or as a means of reducing 
political risk.  On the contrary, they are accepting that they will be held equally to 
account for the end product whether it is delivered by a private contractor or a 
government agency.   In the new environment of mixed public and private delivery of 
public functions, governments are aiming to choose the most efficient and effective 
means of delivery, whether through public agencies or through private contractors, 
depending on the circumstances of the individual case.  Whatever structure is adopted, 
however, governments are still expected to retain ultimate accountability for all 
service provision. As demonstrated, a claim of unaltered accountability in relation to 
outsourced service provision is not strictly accurate, because some aspects of 
accountability are inevitably reduced through the use of private contractors.   But 
governments must still accept collective liability for praise or blame even though they 
have surrendered some mechanisms for maintaining control of the outcomes.  
Ministers are no more justified in buck-passing to private contractors than they are in 
buck-passing to public servants. The notion that a purchaser/provider split 
fundamentally alters the extent of government accountability is being quietly 
jettisoned in response to unchanging public expectations. 
This is not to say that ministers or their senior officials never engage in buck-
passing.  Indeed, an increase in attempted blame-shifting and buck-passing has 
become a familiar feature of a more open and differentiated public sector (Hood 
2002). However, the public have never happily accepted buck-passing in relation to 
outsourced services.  Ministers and senior officials are under strong political pressure 
to repudiate any attempt at blame-shifting and to retain collective liability. The claim 
that accountability is retained should be seen as a statement of such repudiation. 
Rhetoric, no doubt, and not strictly literally correct.  However, it can be welcomed as 
a commitment by governments to accept liability for the quality of outsourced 
services.  It is also a tribute to the continuing force of the conventions of ministerial 
responsibility. 
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V 
Governments are seeking to minimise the relevance of the precise legal status 
of service providers, aiming to employ whichever type of organisation, public or 
private, will perform the task most efficiently and effectively. Indeed, the 
organisational contrast between a government department that provides services itself 
and a government department that combines with private contractors in a series of 
professional partnerships may be seen as more a difference of degree than one of clear 
institutional divergence.  In both cases, front-line providers are controlled to some 
extent by ministers and departmental heads while, at the same time, they enjoy a 
certain level of independence. The respective degrees of control and autonomy vary 
between the two types of arrangement but not as sharply as might be implied by  
simplified pictures of unified government departments and quite separate private 
providers.  Government departments, like other large-scale institutions, are not 
monolithic and do not operate under a single point of control.  Personal responsibility 
for departmental actions is typically dispersed among the various members of the 
department, though they act within overall direction imposed from above.  In 
contractual relationships, on the other hand, particularly for complex and politically 
sensitive services, government influence is pervasive among the staff of the 
contracting organisation even if the organisation that employs them is legally separate 
from government.  Such influence goes well beyond specific terms in a judicable 
contract.  As the Job Network indicates, contractors and their staff are being imbued 
with the government's general policy goals and with public service values in ways not 
fundamentally dissimilar from public servants.    
From this perspective, expecting ministers to take responsibility for the actions 
of contractors is merely an extension of current conventions of ministerial 
responsibility.  Even with departmental actions, the notion that the minister is 
personally responsible for all actions taken by departmental officials is a myth 
(Thompson and Tillotsen1999).  Apart from the (exceptional) cases where the 
minister can be demonstrated to have been personally at fault, the conventions of 
ministerial responsibility merely oblige the minister, like the head of any other large 
organisation, to take collective blame and responsibility on behalf of the department 
as a whole, providing information, investigating mistakes and imposing remedies.  
That the minister did not know (or should not have known) about the particular action 
of a departmental official, while it may exonerate the minister from any need to resign 
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or accept any other personal sanction, is not seen as an excuse for avoiding collective 
responsibility on behalf of the department and the government.  Indeed, taking the 
collective rap for actions beyond one's immediate personal control is an essential part 
of all leadership.   
Taking the blame for the actions of contractors is simply another instance of 
ministers accepting corporate responsibility for actions beyond their immediate 
personal control but under their overall direction.  It reveals the flexibility and power 
of ministerial responsibility, properly understood. At the same time, such acceptance 
implies a reinforcement and possible increase in levels of government control over 
private providers. As with instances departmental failure, ministers who are forced to 
answer for the mistakes of  others will want to be assured that such mistakes do not 
happen again and will typically seek to impose procedures designed to prevent future 
recurrence.  For their part, the miscreant contractors, as with their departmental 
counterparts, will be keen not to embarrass the minister further and will be 
particularly assiduous in pursuing government objectives.  As a result,  private 
contractors, such as the members of the Job Network, can expect themselves to be 
dragged further and further into the government embrace.  Outsourcing may weaken 
some aspects of public accountability, especially over inputs and processes.  But 
government accountability for results brings increased control over private 
organisations who contract to provide public services.   
 17
REFERENCES 
Abbott, T. (1999), Address to Jobs Australia 19 May 1999 
(www.dwrsb.gov.au/ministers/abbott/speeches/1999) 
 
ARC (Administrative Review Council) (1998), Contracting Out of Government 
Services, Report No 42, Canberra. 
 
Australian Employment Services (2002), Employment Services Contract 2003-2006 
(www.workplace.gov.au). 
 
Barrett,  P. (1999), ‘The convergence of the public and private sector –accountability 
versus efficiency’, Australian National Audit Office (www.anao.gov.au) 
 
Barrett, P. (2001), 'Auditing in an outsourced environment', Australian National Audit 
Office (www.anao.gov.au) 
 
Barrett, P. (2004), 'Outsourcing and partnerships in the public sector', Australian 
National Audit Office (www.anao.gov.au) 
 
Considine, M. (2001), Enterprising States. The Public Management of Welfare-to-
Work (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press) 
 
Considine, M. (2002), ‘The end of the line? Accountable governance in the age of 
networks, partnerships and joined-up services’, Governance 15 (1), 21-40 
 
DEWR (Department of Employment and Workplace Relations) (2002a), Employment 
Services Contract 2003-2006 (www.workplace.gov.au). 
 
DEWR (Department of Employment and Workplace Relations) (2002b), Employment 
Services Code of Conduct. Schedule 2 of Employment Services Contract 2003-
2006(www.workplace.gov.au). 
 
 
 18
DOFA (Department of Finance and Administration) (2005), Procurement Guidelines 
(www.dofa.gov.au). 
 
Funnell, W. (2001), Government by Fiat (Sydney: University of New South Wales 
Press) 
 
Hodge, G. A. (1998), ‘Contracting public sector services: a meta-analytic perspective 
of the international evidence’, Australian Journal of Public Administration 57(4), 98-
110 
 
Hood, C. (2002), ‘The risk game and the blame game’, Government and Opposition 
37, 15-37 
 
HREOC (Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission) (2000) Annual Report 
1999-2000 (www.hreoc.gov.au/annrep_99_00) 
 
HREOC (Undated) The Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act 1986 
(Cth): its Application to Religious Freedom and the Right to Non-Discrimination in 
Employment (hreoc.gov.au/human_rights/religion) 
 
Industry Commission (1996), Competitive Tendering and Contracting Out by Public 
Sector Agencies (Melbourne: Australian Government Publishing Service) 
 
JCPAA (Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit) (2000), Contract 
Management in the Australian Public Service 
(www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/ipaa). 
  
Mulgan, R. (1997), ‘Contracting out and accountability’, Australian Journal of Public 
Administration 56 (4), 106-16 
 
Mulgan, R. (2003), Holding Power to Account (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan) 
 
 19
New Zealand Treasury (1987), Government Management (Wellington: Government 
Printer) 
 
O' Toole, B. J. and Chapman, R. (1995), 'Parliamentary accountability'  in B. J. 
O'Toole and G. Jordan (eds), Next Steps. Improving Management in Government? 
(Aldershot: Dartmouth), 118-41 
 
Owens, K. (2001), 'The Job Network: how legal and accountable are its 
(un)employment services?', Australian Journal of Administrative Law 8, 49-60 
 
Seddon, N. (2004), Government Contracts. Federal, State and Local (Sydney: 
Federation Press) 
 
SFPARC (Senate Finance And Public Administration References Committee) (2001), 
Commonwealth contracts: A new framework for accountability, Canberra. 
 
Thompson, E. and Tillotsen, G. (1999), ‘Caught in the act: the smoking gun view of 
ministerial responsibility’, Australian Journal of Public Administration 58 (1), 48-57 
 
Woodhouse, D. (1997), In Pursuit of Good Administration (Oxford: Clarendon Press) 
 
